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Abstract. The paper builds an oligopoly model of a debit card network.
It examines the competition between debit card issuers. We show that
there is an optimal pricing for the debit card network, which maximizes
all issuer’s revenues. The paper also shows that establishing a link between
debit card networks averages the costs provided that there is no growth in
the customer’s usage of the networks, resulting from the link.
1. Introduction. Debit card systems were developed to provide an
electronic means for consumers to access their deposit accounts with banks to
pay for purchases at point-of-sale. These point-of-sale (POS) debit card systems
have proved to be popular with consumers and merchants.
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Debit card systems should be generally accepted by merchants and custo-
mers in order to be successful. In fragmented banking market, it would be
difficult for any bank to achieve widespread access. In such markets, multi-bank
organization was developed to link the accounts of all bank depositors to a wide
range of merchants, with whom the banks had business relationships. In more
concentrated banking markets, single banks may sponsor a debit card system
that offers widespread access to its participants.
The systems linking different banks are usually called networks. The
physical arrangement of the network usually involves telecommunication lines
across which electronic transaction information is transmitted, linked by compu-
ters that route the information between merchants and the card issuing bank.
These computers are often called switches, as they route, or switch, the informa-
tion to participants.
Banks can participate in a debit card system either by (co-)owning the
switch or linking to it. If more than one bank owns a switch, the owners usually
participate as issuers of debit cards.
Non-banks can also participate in the debit card systems. In case a non-
bank owns the switch, bank membership in the debit card network is essential
for the provision of cards that draw on deposit accounts.
Membership arrangements play an important role in specifying the legal
rights and obligations of participants. Following [2], several antitrust publications
have discussed the potential anticompetitive effects of the collective determination
of interchange fees within payment card associations (See also [4], [10], [11], [7]
and [1]). Formal models of the payment card industry have been developed
recently, allowing for a more rigorous analysis of the impact of interchange fees
on prices and volumes of activity in payment card networks. These models have
also highlighted the existence of common patterns between this industry and
other network industries (See for example [16]). The objective of this paper is to
provide new oligopoly model of a debit card network, which aims at determining
the optimal fees for the network. We use different arrangements for the debit card
network, giving us a good platform to examine the price competition between
issuers.
If there exist more than one debit card network, then the merchants
in one network will not be accessible for the debit card holders belonging to
another network(s) unless there are some links between these networks. This can
be achieved in several ways. One solution is the switches to link together on
either bilateral or multilateral basis. This is the most common form for achieving
interconnectivity in systems with more than one network. The other solution is
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merchants (directly or through an acquirer) and/or card issuers to participate in
more than one network. In this paper we examine the first model by allowing two
debit card networks to link. Furthermore, the paper shows that establishing a
link between debit card networks averages the costs given that there is no growth
in the customer’s usage of the networks, resulting from the link.
2. Assumptions of the basic model
2.1. Agents. There is a very large number of debit cards, issued to
customers. The debit cards are numbered 0, 1, 2, . . . , n. The debit cards are
issued to the holders for free. The issuer pays all fees related to the issuance.
Debit card holders live in one country.
There is a debit card network with a profit-maximizing switch. The switch
operates as a platform industry [16], because it needs two types of customers that
wish to interact: merchant(s) and debit card holders.
The switch registers all transactions with debit cards in the country. All
debit card transactions are settled at the switch. Running the settlement process
generates costs. The unit cost of the switch per transaction is z.
In the network, there are two debit card issuers denoted by 1 and 2.
Every issuer has issued at least one debit card. Issuer i charges customer fee pi
per transaction, regardless of the transaction value.
There is one merchant in the network. The merchant cannot become
member of foreign debit card networks. The merchant achieves a turnover via
pricing of his service to debit card holders. The merchant discount is m.
Our analysis makes two simplifying assumptions, which fit well into the
debit card industry. First, we assume that the issuers compete with each other,
following the Bertrand model of price competition [3]. The second simplifying
assumption is that customers have a fixed volume of transactions, normalized to
one transaction, i.e. there is inelastic demand for the merchant’s goods and/or
services.
2.2. Order of moves. The model is a full information game, in which
agents can always correctly calculate each others decisions and moves. Moves are
made in the following order.
1. The debit card network switch sets its switch fee z, where z > 0.
2. Debit card issuers determine their customer fees pi. Every issuer tries to
maximize his own wealth by minimizing the expected value of the sum of
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fees paid out (switch fee z), and maximize the value of the fees paid in (the
corresponding customer fee pi). The issuers make revenues, if pi > z.
3. The merchant discount fee m is determined by the debit card network
participants. The switch makes revenue if m > z.
4. Each customer chooses an issuer, opens a deposit account with it, and
receives a debit card for accessing his deposit account. These choices are
made independently and simultaneously without cooperation.
5. Customers make their payments. See Figure 2.1
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Fig. 2.1
2.3. Customer’s preference. The total utility of a customer is deter-
mined by the fees charged for using the debit card and the customer’s preference
between the two issuers.
Each consumer has to make a discrete choice between the two banks.
Three factors are taken into account: First, the distance to the bank, secondly,
a general preference parameter (G), and finally the number of other customers
who are going to use the same bank. Customers can correctly calculate others
choices and the resulting market shares.
The expected utility of consumer x is
Wx =
{
G + (2− ix) + s(p2 − p1), if he chooses issuer 1;
−G + (ix − 1) + (1− s)(p1 − p2), if he chooses issuer 2.
(2.1)
where
• G is an exogenous preference parameter. The parameter is exogenous and
common to all customers. If G > 0, issuer 1 is preferred by most customers.
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If G < 0, most customers prefer issuer 2. If G = 0, customers are, on
average, indifferent between the two issuers. This parameter does not reflect
any scale or network effects, and its value is not affected by other customers’
choices.
• ix is a customer-specific exogenous parameter, denoting the location of the
customer. The issuers are located at the endpoints of the interval, issuer 1
at point 1 and issuer 2 at point 2. Getting service from an issuer that is close
to the customer provides the customer with higher utility. If 1 ≤ ix < 1
1
2
,
parameter i favors issuer 1, if 1 1
2
< ix ≤ 2, parameter i favors issuer 2, and
if ix = 1
1
2
, the parameter is neutral as between the two issuers. Because the
common parameter G may differ from zero, ix < 1
1
2
does not necessarily
imply that consumer x would prefer issuer 1.
• s is the endogenously determined market share of issuer 1.
• p2 − p1 is the difference between the customer fees, charged by the two
issuers. If p2 − p1 > 0, the customer would rather prefer issuer 1, which
has lower customer fee. This can be interpreted as the customer prefers the
more cost-efficient debit card. Also, we should take into account the market
share of the debit card issuer as a measure of how willing is the customer
to use this card. Therefore, the expected utility of making a payment with
a debit card from issuer 1 is s(p2 − p1). Analogically, the expected utility
of making a payment with debit card from issuer 2 is (1− s)(p1 − p2).
With the exception of the preference parameter ix, all parameters are common
to all customers.
We suppose that the issuers and the switch are making revenue, so we
require
pi > z > 0 and m > z > 0.
As we will see later, parameters G, p1 and p2 must satisfy inequality (3.4)
−1 < 2G + p2 − p1 < 1.
There is a pure network externality in the model. Using the same issuer
as the majority of customers provides the consumer with utility. This network
effect is a direct externality and is not caused by the effects of other customers
choices on any prices.
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Issuers cannot practice price discrimination, because they cannot observe
the exact location of different consumers on the interval [1, 2].
2.4. Issuers’ revenues. The revenue of issuer 1, when the cost of debit
card network operation is not taken into account, is
Π1 = ns(p1 − z)
and the revenue of issuer 2 is
Π2 = n(1− s)(p2 − z).
3. Solving the basic model
3.1. Competition between issuers. The utility of customer x is
determined according to function (2.1).
The customer x chooses issuer 1, if
G + (2− ix) + s(p2 − p1) > −G + (ix − 1) + (1− s)(p1 − p2) ⇐⇒
ix < (3 + 2G + p2 − p1)/2
(3.1)
The market share of issuer 1 is determined by the number of customers
for whom the condition is valid.
The density function is uniform on [0, n]. Hence, because n is a very large
integer, the market share is almost exactly
s =
1
n
∫ c
1
ndi,
where c is the point where the condition for ix (3.1) is no longer valid, i.e.
c = (3 + 2G + p2 − p1)/2
The market share is given by
(3.2) s =
1 + 2G + p2 − p1
2
.
Similarly, issuer 2 market share is
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(3.3) (1− s) =
1− 2G + p1 − p2
2
.
Since the market shares should be between 0% and 100%, we derive the
following inequality
(3.4) −1 < 2G + p2 − p1 < 1.
In the following, it is assumed that each issuer has a positive market share, even
though a market share may be close to zero.
The situation is symmetric, the only difference between the two issuers
being the eventually nonzero value of 2G + p2 − p1. Therefore, all the following
results are equally valid for both issuers. To simplify the notation, the analysis
is in most cases presented only for issuer 1.
Formula (3.2) implies effects that are quite intuitive: if the issuer charges
higher fees than its competitor, its market share declines.
We have that ds/dp1 = −1/2. Whenever formula (3.2) predicts positive
values of issuer 2’s market share, ds/dp1 < 0, which is reasonable.
If issuer 1 is not popular (G < 0), his market share remains small. On
the other hand, high prices charged by its rival increase his market share.
3.2. Issuers’ pricing decisions.
Proposition 3.1. There exist optimal customers’ fees maximizing both
issuers’ revenues.
P r o o f. An issuer can change its customer fee, so we consider the revenue
function of both issuers as a function of the customer fee. The optimization
conditions are
dΠ1
dp1
=
n
2
(1+z+2G+p2−2p1) = ns−
n(p1 − z)
2
= 0⇔ p1 = z + 2s
dΠ2
dp2
=
n
2
(1+z−2G+p1−2p2) = n(1− 2)−
n(p2 − z)
2
= 0⇔ p2 = z + 2(1− s)
The first derivatives of Π1 and Π2 should be zero for one and the same
market share s. We obtain an unique combination of customer prices
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p01 = 1 + z + 2G/3
p02 = 1 + z − 2G/3
s0 = 1/2 + G/3
(3.5)
Π1 has a local extremum for (p
0
1, p
0
2). The extremum is a local maximum, because
the second derivative is negative.
d2Π1
dp1
2
=
d
dp1
(
n(1 + z + 2G + 2p2 − p1)
2
)
= −
n
2
< 0
Similarly, Π2 has a local maximum for (p
0
1, p
0
2), because
d2Π2
dp2
2
=
d
dp2
(
n(1 + z − 2G + 2p1 − p2)
2
)
= −
n
2
< 0
We proved that there exists an unique pair of customer prices (p01, p
0
2) for which
both issuers’ revenues are maximized. 
3.3. Switch revenues. The switch revenue is determined by Φ =
n(z−m). Increase of the switch fee z should cause the issuers to proportionately
raise their customer fees pi in order to optimize them, and vice versa, lowering
the switch fee z should cause the issuers to proportionately lower the customers’
fees pi.
Note that any increase in the switch fees is actually paid by the customers,
when the issuer’s pricing is at the optimal level.
4. Bilateral model. Suppose we have two debit card networks, confor-
ming to the described basic model. Also suppose that the issuers’ pricing is at the
optimal level at both networks, and the merchants in both networks are selling
the same good for the same price. See Figure 4.1
We want the merchants to be accessible by all customers, which is achieved
by providing a bilateral link between them. The cost of using the link is l, where
l > 0 and it is paid by the customer network’s switch, when the customer buys
from the merchant of the other network. Establishing the bilateral link should
not affect the market shares of the issuers in the individual networks, and they
will stay at the optimal level.
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The customer can buy the goods from either merchant for the same price,
which makes both merchants indistinguishable from the customer’s standpoint.
This affects the merchant discount fee of the domestic network. Since the custo-
mer can buy from both merchants, then the new effective merchant fee for both
networks can be written as follows:
(4.1) mnew =
m′ + m′′ + l
2
.
The merchant fee for the given network decreases/increases if mdomestic−
mforeign is greater/lower than l, and stays the same if mdomestic − mforeign = l.
Note that since l > 0, in any case the merchant fee in one network increases,
while the merchant fee in the other network decreases.
The change in the effective merchant fee results in a change in the switch
revenue. Since the switch is profit-maximizing one, the switch fee should increase/
decrease in the case when the merchant fee increases/decreases, so that the switch
makes a profit at least equal to the profit before establishing the link. If the
customers buy as many goods as before, then the switch fee should change with
the difference between the new and old merchant fees.
The above can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 4.1. Bilaterally interlinking two debit card networks results
in new merchant fee
mnew =
m′ + m′′ + l
2
,
thus, at least in one of the networks, the merchant fee will increase as a result of
establishing the link.
44 Peter Manchev
Corollary 4.2. The switch fee of the bilaterally linked debit card networks
increases/decreases in the case where the merchant fee increases/decreases. If the
customers buy as many goods as before, then the switch fee will change with the
difference between the new and old merchant fees.
5. Conclusions. This paper presents an oligopoly model of the debit
card industry. The main focus is the competition between two debit card issuers,
participating in a monopolistic national debit card network, and the impact of
establishing a link between two such debit card networks.
The paper shows that there exist optimal customer fees, maximizing
both issuer’s revenues. The paper also shows that establishing a link between
debit card networks averages the costs provided that there is no growth in the
customer’s usage of the networks, resulting from the link.
The model used in this paper approximates a specific class of debit card
networks. Real life networks are much more complex in nature, yet the main
results of the paper still give us some good ideas what actually could happen in
practice.
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